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Abstract
We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist
equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed
to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the
conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The
emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic pref-




Social norms are pervasive in human society. For example, consumption
norms dictate what clothes, cars or music are ‘acceptable’ or ‘fashionable’
while work norms dictate ‘proper effort’, ‘normal working hours’ or a ‘rea-
sonable wage’ (Lewis 1967, Akerlof 1980, Jones 1984, Elster 1989, Bernheim
1994). Norms can be sustained because of ‘costs to non-conformity’ in the
form of indirect costs, such as guilt, or more direct costs, such as being
forced out of employment (Kreps 1997). But: Why do some actions become
norms but not others? Why do norms emerge in some choice settings and
not others? and, Can policy makers influence behavior though manipulat-
ing norms?1 In this paper we study a simple multiple equilibrium model of
conformity with the aim of gaining some insight on these issues.
In the model, an agent’s payoff is a sum of intrinsic utility, determined
solely by his own action, and social utility, determined by how his action
‘fits with that of others’. Social utility is determined relative to some norm
of behavior and depends on how closely an agent’s actions conform to the
norm and on the proportion of the population that are conforming to the
norm. If nobody conforms then social utility is zero irrespective of behavior
and agents maximize utility by maximizing intrinsic utility. If everybody
conforms to the norm then social utility is such that all agents maximize
utility by conforming, even if they sacrifice intrinsic utility in doing so. This
implies multiple equilibria, including a ‘non-conformist’ equilibrium where
all agents maximize intrinsic utility (or ‘do what they want’) and ‘conformist
equilibria’ where all agents conform to some norm and receive maximal social
utility (but sacrifice intrinsic utility).
What equilibrium should we expect to emerge? To address this equilib-
1The Fresno State Social Norms Project is one example of attempting to influence
behavior through manipulating norms. The aim of the project is to reduce alcohol abuse
through changing student perceptions of ‘normal behavior’. Other possibilities include
influencing attitudes to saving for retirement, recycling, playing truant at school etc.
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rium selection question we use a standard evolutionary or learning model
approach (Fudenberg and Levine 1998). Agents are modelled as interact-
ing repeatedly over time and choosing an action using a best reply rule: an
agent chooses the action in this period that would have maximized his pay-
off in the last period. Occasional shocks perturb the system and thus allow
the dynamic to potentially evolve between different conformist equilibria or
from a conformist to non-conformist equilibrium and so on. We shall detail
the conditions under which conformity can emerge and the actions that may
become norms.
Why can an action emerge as a norm? For some agents, conforming to
the norm may be a relatively ‘easy option’ because any sacrifice in intrinsic
utility is small and so a little social utility is enough to compensate. As
the proportion of conforming agents increases then the social utility from
conformity increases and other agents become willing to sacrifice increased
amounts of intrinsic utility to conform. Conformity can therefore spread
through a ripple effect to those who must sacrifice the most intrinsic utility to
conform. This logic can be reversed to argue that non-conformity can emerge
because ‘not-conforming’ is a relatively ‘easy option’ for those who could gain
most intrinsic utility from ‘not-conforming’, and so on. The balance is tipped
towards the emergence of conformity if conforming is the ‘easy option’ for
a larger proportion of agents than is not-conforming. Norms most likely to
emerge are those that require relatively little sacrifice in intrinsic utility for
a significant proportion of the population.
For the most part we focus on a global interaction setting where agents
could be seen to interact on a population wide level. Thus, social utility is
determined by the total population. In Section 5 we consider an alternative,
local interaction setting, where norms and social utility are determined rel-
ative to a particular location. The analysis of the global interaction setting
naturally extends to the local interaction setting. The local interaction set-
ting does, however, generate ‘richer dynamics’ of multiple, evolving norms as
3
we shall illustrate through examples. These examples will demonstrate how
the dynamics of conformity depend on the ‘topology of agent interaction’.
We shall not attempt in this paper to explain why individuals have desires
for social utility or ‘to fit in’.2 It will be taken as given that a conformist
equilibrium exists in the sense that if everybody conforms to a norm then
everybody would want to conform to the norm. As such, we do not attempt
to provide a complete story of why a conformist equilibrium would emerge.
By detailing, however, when a conformist or non-conformist equilibrium can
emerge and by characterizing the actions that can become norms we can
provide important insights on the emergence of norms.
Closely related results are due to Akerlof (1980) and Azar (2004). Azar
(2004) questioned why a tipping norm can persist. He showed that for a
norm to persist there must be sufficient agents who ‘like tipping’. This result
is consistent with our analysis where an action becomes a norm if there are
sufficiently many agents who receive high intrinsic utility from conforming.
Akerlof (1980), using the example of a norm to set artificially high wages,
questioned whether social custom would be gradually eroded if it is costly
for individuals to persist in the custom. He showed that custom can survive.
Our analysis suggests that one could go further by saying that conformity
or social custom can not only survive but emerge, even if it is not in agents
interests for it to do so. Indeed, whether or not conformity or non-conformity
emerges in our model is unrelated to the relative Pareto ranking of conformist
and non-conformist equilibria. One strand of the existing literature on con-
formity attempts to explain social norms as ‘optimal’ in the sense that a
conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates a non-conformist equilibrium (El-
ster 1989). Our results reflect the common thread in the literature on best
reply dynamics that the risk dominance of equilibria and not Pareto ranking
2See, amongst others, Jones (1984), Bernheim (1994), Kreps (1997) or just about any
social psychology textbook for more on this issue. Also, Wooders, Cartwright and Selten
(2006) show that in any game with many agents there exists a ‘conformist equilibrium’
(where similar agents perform similar actions) irrespective of any desires for social utility.
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is key (Young 1993). Related results are also due to Ochs and Park (2004)
who model a dynamic adoption process where agents subscribe to a network
if network size is sufficiently large. Differences in agent preferences create a
ripple effect, similar to the one of this paper, where the more subscribe to
the network the more will be induced to subscribe to the network.
The motivation behind this paper was to study ‘emotional’ or ‘social’ con-
formity whereby individuals conform to ‘fit in’ or ’avoid guilt’ etc. In reality
social utility, as we define it, could be interpreted much more generally. For
example ‘social utility’ could reflect tangible benefits from agent coordina-
tion or institutionalized punishment for not obeying rules. Our framework is,
however, somewhat distinct from that modelling conformity in coordination
games (e.g. Young 1993) because non-conformity (or non-coordination) is an
equilibrium and indeed payoffs at the non-conformist equilibrium may exceed
those of the conformist equilibrium. There is also no appeal to incomplete
information in our model. This distinguishes our results from the literature
on ‘informational’ conformity (e.g. Bikhandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992,
Juang 2001) where agents imitate successful or popular actions in the hope
of obtaining a higher intrinsic utility.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 presents
the main results, Section 4 provides examples of payoff functions, Section 5
discusses local interaction and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are contained
in an Appendix
2 Model and notation
The model used is inspired by that of Bernheim (1994).3 There exists a
continuum of agents. Each agent has a type from a set T ≡ [−1, 1]. A
population is described by a cumulative distribution function F , with cor-
3There are some notable differences. In particular, Bernheim (1994) provides a more
subtle model of conformity in which actions serve as a signal of type.
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responding continuous probability density function f , over the set of types
T where f(−1), f(1) > 0.4 Agents simultaneously choose an action from
set X = [−1, 1]. For simplicity, agents of the same type will be assumed
to choose the same action.5 This allows us to describe actions by an action
profile a that maps T into X with a(t) indicating the action chosen by agents
of type t. Let A denote the set of action profiles.
The payoff of an agent is the sum of two components - intrinsic utility
and social utility. We define each in turn.
2.1 Intrinsic utility
Intrinsic utility depends on the difference between type and action; formally,
there exists function I : [0, 2] → R such that an agent of type t receives
intrinsic utility I(|t− x|) from choosing action x.6 We make the following
assumption,
Assumption 1: I(z) is continuous, achieves a maximum at z = 0 and is
(weakly) concave.
Thus, an agent of type t maximizes his intrinsic utility by choosing action
x = t. The further his chosen action from t then the lower his intrinsic utility.
We shall say that intrinsic utility is linear if I(z) = β1−β2z for some β2 > 0.
2.2 Social utility
Social utility will be determined relative to some norm. This means making
assumptions of what ‘the norm’ is. We will assume that an action constitutes
the norm if it is being chosen by a larger proportion of the population than
any other action. Let ρ(x, a) be the proportion of the population choosing
4More formally, we can allow that f(−1), f(1) = 0 but require that f(−1+α), f(1−α) >
0 for some α > 0 arbitrarily small.
5See footnote 12 in Section 2.5 for further elaboration on this assumption.
6To simplify notation we shall write I(t− x) instead of I (|t− x|).
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action x given action profile a.7 We shall denote by µ(a) the ‘norm’ given
action profile a. If there exists action x∗ ∈ X such that ρ(x∗, a) > ρ(x, a)
for all x 6= x∗ then we call x∗ the norm and set µ(a) = x∗. Otherwise we
say that there is no norm and set µ(a) = φ. If there does exist a norm x∗
then an agent who chooses x∗ is said to conform while an agent who does
not choose x∗ is said to not conform.






µ(a)+1 if x ∈ [−1, µ(a))
x−µ(a)
1−µ(a) if x ∈ (µ, 1(a)]
0 if x = µ(a)
. (1)
Value ∆(x) denotes ‘relative distance’ between action x and the norm µ(a).
The value of ∆ can range from 0 to 1 with 0 indicating conformity and 1 that
either action 1 or −1, the actions most removed from the norm, are chosen.8
Let ρ(a) := ρ(µ(a), a) denote the proportion of the population conforming
to the norm. If µ(a) = φ then set ∆(x) = 0 for all x and ρ(a) = 0.
Social utility will depend on relative distance ∆(x) and proportion ρ(a);
formally, there exists a social utility function E : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → R such
that an agent choosing action x given action profile a receives social utility
E(∆(x), ρ(a)). We shall normalize E(∆, 0) = 0 for all ∆. Thus, social
utility is zero irrespective of action if there is no norm. As discussed in
the introduction (see also Section 4) ‘social utility’ is really just a measure
of the general ‘costs or benefits’ to conforming. For example, social utility
could reflect network effects or be positive or negative etc.9 Note also that
7In a continuum population ρ(x, a) may equal 0 for all x.
8The choice of relative distance (i.e. for x > µ relative to 1−µ and for x < µ relative to
µ−(−1)) is for convenience and we could obtain equivalent results using absolute distance
x− µ.
9Kreps (1997) states four reasons for conformity: 1. conformity is costless, 2. con-
formity permits coordination, 3. conformity is costly but leads to future benefits (e.g.
avoidance of guilt), and 4. conformity is desirable in itself. Reason 1 is a reflection of
a ‘flat’ intrinsic utility function. Reasons 2, 3 and 4 could be incorporated within our
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social utility does not depend on type or on the norm. This is a simplifying
assumption that could be relaxed.
Some justification should be made for our choice of norm. The primary
assumption made is that there exists at most one norm. If there is only
one norm, then modelling the norm as the ‘most observed’ action seems
appropriate but our method of proof would allow us to define the norm
differently, for example, as some exogenous focal point. More contentious
is the assumption that there be a unique norm given that one may imagine
different norms in different sections of the population. On a practical level
it is not clear how one would model multiple norms within a social utility
function as defined above. Instead, we shall model, in Section 5, multiple
norms as arising from local interaction. That is, we shall permit different
norms in different sections of the population but use a framework of local
interaction to determine what are ‘different sections of the population’.
It seems natural that social utility should be decreasing in the ‘individual
extent of non-conformity’ as given by ∆. We allow for the possibility of a
discontinuity in ∆ at 0 to reflect a possible discrete jump in social utility
between conformity and non conformity.
Assumption 2: E(∆, ρ) is non-increasing in ∆ and continuous in ∆ with a
possible exception at ∆ = 0.
Assumptions 1 and 2 will be made throughout without further acknowledg-
ment. We also introduce two Properties on payoff functions that while harder
to interpret shall essentially prove to be necessary and sufficient conditions
in the analysis. We discuss both Properties further in Section 4.
Property 1: For any action profile a ∈ A
E(0, ρ(a))− E(ρ(a), ρ(a)) ≥ ρ(a) [E(0, 1)−E(1, 1)] . (2)
definition of social utility.
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The value E(0, 1)−E(1, 1) compares conformity with choosing −1 or 1 when
all agents conform and thus measures the largest possible differential in social
utility. Given an action profile a in which proportion ρ are conforming,
Property 1 requires that the drop in social utility from choosing an action x at
relative distance of ρ from µ(a) is equal to ρ times the largest possible drop in
social utility. This requires (see Section 4) that social utility drop relatively
sharply for non conformity. For example, if claiming zero unemployment
benefit is the norm (Akerlof 1980, Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull 1999) then
Property 1 would require that claiming some unemployment benefit leads to
a relatively large drop in social utility.10 Examples satisfying this property
are provided in Section 4. We say that Property 1 holds with equality if the
inequality in (2) can be replaced by an equality. We say that Property 1
does not hold if the inequality in (2) can be replaced by a strictly less than
inequality.11
2.3 Payoff functions
Payoffs are given by function u : X × T ×A→ R where
u(x, t, a) = I(t− x) +E(∆(x), ρ(a)). (3)
is the payoff of an agent of type t from choosing action x given action profile
a. We introduce a second Property relating intrinsic utility to social utility.
Property 2: For any action profile a and actions t, x ∈ X where either
µ(a) < x < t or t < x < µ(a),
[E(0, δt)−E(δx, δt)]−[E(0, δx)− E(δx, δx)] ≥ [I(t− x)− I(t− µ)]−[I(0)− I(x− µ)]
(4)
10To fit this example with our action space we can equate x = −1 with zero unemploy-
ment and x = 1 with 50 years unemployment. The norm is µ = −1.
11This is a strong notion of requiring Property 1 to not hold in that we require the less
than inequality to apply for any action profile a ∈ A.
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where δt := ∆(t) and δx := ∆(x).
If intrinsic utility is linear then the right hand side of (4) is zero and so,
given that δt > δx, Property 2 merely requires, as intuition would suggest,
that the differential in social utility between conforming and non-conforming
should be non-decreasing in the proportion of the population conforming
(Akerlof 1980, Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull 1999). For example, the less
people are claiming unemployment benefit the greater the stigma to claiming
unemployment benefit. If intrinsic utility is strictly concave then the right
hand side of (4) is strictly positive and so we require more. The more concave
is intrinsic utility then the wider need grow the gap in social utility between
conforming and non-conforming as the proportion conforming increases. We
say that Property 2 does not hold if the inequality of equation (4) can be
replaced by a strictly less than inequality.
2.4 Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is an action profile a such that u(a(t), t, a) ≥ u(x, t, a) for
all x ∈ X and t ∈ T . The assumptions made are sufficient for the existence
of a non-conformist equilibrium a where a(t) = t for all t ∈ T and µ(a) = φ.
That is, social utility is zero and an agent of type t chooses x = t, maximizing
intrinsic utility. We say that there exists a conformist equilibrium centered




(t) = x∗ for all t ∈ T if
I(t− x∗) +E(0, 1) ≥ I(t− x) +E(∆(x), 1) (5)
for all t, x ∈ X. A conformist equilibrium ax∗ is said to be not strict if
there exists at least one t and x combination for which equation (5) holds
with equality. We say that conformity is an equilibrium if ax is a conformist
equilibrium for any x ∈ X. Finally, we say that conformity is not a strict
equilibrium if ax is not a strict conformist equilibrium for any x ∈ X.
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2.5 Dynamics
Agents interact over an indefinite number of time periods τ = 0, 1, 2, ....
There exists an initial action profile a0. Let aτ(t) denote the action chosen
by agents of type t in period τ . We shall consider a variant of a best reply
dynamic in which each agent primarily chooses the action for the current pe-
riod that would have maximized his payoff in the previous period (Fudenberg
and Levine 1998). Given action profile a an agent of type t has best reply set
Bt(a) := {x ∈ X : u(x, t, a) ≥ u(x0, t, a) for all x0 ∈ X}. The set Bt(a) may
contain multiple actions. In this case we assume agents would pick the action









as the proportion of the population for whom x is a best reply given action
profile a.
For the most part we assume that the proportion of the population who
choose action x in period τ is given by ρ(x, aτ) = ρB(x, aτ−1). However, in
each period τ with probability λ > 0 there is a shock. If there is a shock then
some action x 6= µ(a) is randomly selected and the proportion choosing x is
given by13
ρ(x, aτ ) = ρB(x, aτ−1) + ε
12In the model agents who are indifferent between conforming and not-conforming will
conform. This can clearly be criticized for making conformity more likely. In reality, any
tie breaking rule would suffice and all of our results would hold with the rule BRt(a) =
minx∈Bt(a){|x− t|}. The rule we use has the merits of greatly simplifying the analysis.
13Or, if ρB(x, aτ−1) > 1− ε then ρ(x, aτ ) = 1.
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where ε > 0 is a real number. Further if x∗ = µ(aτ−1) then14
ρ(x∗, aτ) = ρB(x∗, aτ−1)− ε.
We shall use the phrase ‘a shock to action x’ if x is selected.
The dynamic modelled is one of best reply with shocks where shocks are
minor perturbations to the proportion choosing some action and could be
equated with experimentation or a response to advertising etc. It is a zero
probability event that a ‘positive shock’ occurs twice for the same action
and so the proportion choosing an action purely because of shocks cannot
exceed ε. A ‘positive shock’ is, however, mirrored by a ‘negative shock’ to the
proportion conforming to the norm. Thus, a norm can be subject to repeated
negative shocks. This makes it more difficult for sustained conformity to
emerge. Our results are not dependent on this specific model of shocks,
chosen for convenience. Note that we shall equate a state of the dynamic
with an action profile. More formally, the state of the dynamic is given by
function ρ detailing the proportion choosing each action.
3 The emergence of conformity
We begin by detailing the conditions under which the proportion conforming
to a norm will grow or diminish. If there exists a norm x∗ then those agents
with types near to x∗ have the most incentive to conform. The distribution
of types around x∗ thus proves fundamental. Let
G(γ, x∗) = F ((1− γ)x∗ + γ)− F ((1− γ)x∗ − γ) (6)
for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. Function G measures how agent types are distributed
around x∗. Clearly, G(0, x∗) = 0 and G(1, x∗) = 1. If F is the uniform
distribution then G(γ, x∗) = γ. If, say, G(0.1, x∗) = 0.9 then we could say
14Or, if ρB(x∗, aτ−1) < ε then ρ(x∗, aτ ) = 0.
12
that a high proportion of agents have types near to x∗.
Theorem 1: Consider action profile a where x∗ = µ(a). If Properties 1
and 2 hold and there exists a conformist equilibrium centered on x∗ then
ρB(x∗, a) ≥ G(ρ(a), x∗). If intrinsic utility is linear, Property 1 holds with
equality, Property 2 holds and conformist equilibrium ax
∗
is not strict then
ρB(x∗, a) = G(ρ(a), x∗). If intrinsic utility is linear, there does not ex-
ist a strict conformist equilibrium and Property 1 does not hold or Prop-
erty 1 holds with equality and Property 2 does not hold then ρB(x∗, a) <
G(ρ(a), x∗).15
If conformity to x∗ is to increase then we require ρB(x∗, aτ) to increase.
Theorem 1 indicates that this will depend on the distribution of types around
the norm and whether Properties 1 and 2 hold. In particular, if proportion
ρτ are conforming to norm x∗ in period τ then Properties 1 and 2 imply (see
the Appendix for details) that those agents with types within distance ρτ
of x∗ will conform in period τ + 1. Proportion G(ρτ , x∗) have types within
distance ρτ of x∗. Thus, ρτ+1 = ρB(x∗, aτ) ≥ G(ρτ , x∗). If conformity is
to be sustained and/or increase then we need ρτ+1 ≥ ρτ . So we need that
G(ρτ , x∗) ≥ ρτ . That is we require sufficiently many agents with types near
to x∗.
Applying Theorem 1 we first provide conditions such that the non-conformist
equilibrium will occur with vanishing frequency in the long run.
Corollary 1: If Properties 1 and 2 hold and conformity is an equilibrium
then for sufficiently small ε as λ tends to zero the probability that ρ(aτ) = 0
for large τ also tends to zero.
Thus, given Properties 1 and 2 conformity will emerge to some extent in that
a norm will exist and a positive proportion of the population will sacrifice
15Note that the x∗ here could be some exogenous focal point. Thus, the result is more
genral than assuming the norm is the action played by most agents.
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intrinsic utility in order to conform. The proportion who do conform, how-
ever, could be small. The following result provides conditions under which a
norm will emerge where all agents conform.
Corollary 2: If Properties 1 and 2 hold, conformity is an equilibrium and
there exists x∗ ∈ X such that G(γ, x∗) > γ for all γ ∈ (0, 1) then as λ tends
to zero the probability that ρ(aτ) ≥ 1− ε for large τ tends to one.
For conformity to increase over time we require that G(ρτ , x∗) > ρτ over
consecutive periods. The requirement that G(γ, x∗) > γ for all γ ∈ (0, 1)
captures this in ensuring that ρB(x∗, aτ ) ≥ G(ρτ , x∗) > ρτ . In each period,
the increase in the proportion of agents conforming is enough to entice agents
with ‘more extreme preferences’ to conform and so on. Conformity spreads
from those with types near to x∗ to those with more extreme types. The re-
quirement that G(γ, x∗) > γ for all γ ∈ (0, 1) is relatively mild. For example,
it is satisfied if the distribution over types is unimodal.16 We provide some
illustrations after our next result. Corollaries 1 and 2 do not specify what
norms will emerge but it is clear that actions for which G is ‘large’ are the
most likely candidates. The following result is immediate from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3: Suppose that intrinsic utility is linear and Property 1 holds
with equality. If ρ(aτ) > ε and the conformist equilibrium aµ(a
τ ) is not strict
then G(ρ(aτ), µ(aτ)) ≥ ρ(aτ ).
In reality any norm could emerge if the potential gains to esteem are suffi-
ciently large. Corollary 3, however, shows that whether an x∗ norm could
emerge will depend on G. To illustrate where norms can emerge consider
16By unimodal we mean F (t) ≤ 0.5t for all t ∈ [−1, x∗], F (t) ≥ 0.5t for all t ∈ [x∗, 1]
and f(µ) > f(t) for t 6= µ. Here
G(γ, x∗) = F ((1− γ)x∗ + γ)− F ((1− γ)x∗ − γ)
> 0.5 ((1− γ)x∗ + γ)− 0.5 ((1− γ)x∗ − γ) = γ.
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three examples depicted in Figure 1. For each Example we indicate the
range of x∗ for which G(γ, x∗) > γ for all γ.
Peaked at 0: If f(t) = 1− |t| then x∗ ∈ (−0.5, 0.5).
Peaked at -1: If f(t) = 1
2
(1− t) then x∗ < 0.
Bimodal: If f is symmetric around 0 with f(t) = 1
4
for t ∈ [0, 0.1); f(t) = 4 for
t ∈ [0.1, 0.2]; f(t) = 15
64
(1−t) for t ∈ (0.2, 1] then x∗ ∈ [0.1, 0.2]∪ [−0.2,−0.1].
As already stated the requirement that G(γ, x∗) > γ for all γ does seem mild
but it need not hold. If, for example, approximately half of agents have types
near to −1 and half near to 1 then the requirement is not met. Conformity
need not spread in this case because if, say, all those with types near to −1
conform to an x∗ = −1 norm social utility need not be such that those agents
with types near to 1 wish to conform. Conformity does not spread because
of the disparity in tastes.
4 Conformity and social utility
So far we have emphasized the importance of the distribution over types in
determining the emergence of conformity. In this section we shall explore
the role of payoff functions and the social utility function. If the distribution
over types is uniform then G(γ, x) = γ for all γ and all x and so, given the
discussion above, this presents a limiting case where conformity is ‘least likely
to emerge’. The following result demonstrates the necessity of Properties 1
and 2 in this case.
Corollary 4: Suppose that types are distributed uniformly, conformity is
not a strict equilibrium and intrinsic utility is linear. If Property 1 does not
hold, or Property 1 holds with equality and Property 2 does not hold then
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ρ(aτ ) ≤ ε for all τ .17
If the distribution over types is not uniform (or there exists a strict conformist
equilibrium) then Properties 1 and 2 are not necessary; the ‘incentives to
conform’ inherent in the distribution over types could compensate for the
‘lack of incentives to conform’ implied by a relaxation of Properties 1 and
2. Clearly, however, Properties 1 and 2 are important in determining the
emergence of conformity. We consider four examples, illustrated in Figure
2, to discuss the properties. In looking at Property 2 suppose that I(z) =
β1−β2z−β3z2 for all z and some real numbers β1 and β2, β3 ≥ 0 and µ = 0.
Property 2 reduces to [E(0, t)−E(x, t)]− [E(0, x)−E(x, x)] ≥ 2β3x(t− x)
for t > x > 0 and t < x < 0.




0 if ∆ 6= 0
h(ρ) if ∆ = 0
for some function h. There is no distinction in ‘how close an agent is to con-
forming’. An agent who conforms receives positive social utility and one who
does not receives zero social utility. It is immediate from (2) that Property
1 holds if there is concavity in social utility with respect to ρ. That is, if
h(ρ) ≥ ρ for all ρ. Thus we require social utility to be ‘relatively responsive
to ρ’ when ρ is small. Property 2 requires β3 to be sufficiently small. For
example, if h(ρ) = ρ then β3 ≤ 0.5 would do.
This form of social utility function is extreme in its distinction between
conformity and non-conformity and easily satisfies the two properties but is
not unreasonable for certain choice settings. Bernheim (1994) considers a
model of conformity where any deviation from a norm is seen as a signal of
an agent with ‘most extreme types’. Thus, any deviation from the norm leads
17By Theorem 1 we know that ρB(x∗, a) < G(ρ(a), x∗). Given that f is uniform we
have that G(ρ(a), x∗) = ρ(a). The result is now immediate.
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to a substantial loss in social utility. Function E1 may also be appropriate in
dealing with network or coordination effects. If there is a positive externality
from using the same action as others then this could be modelled by setting
h(ρ) = ρ.
Example 2, a continuous social utility function: Let,
E2(∆, ρ) = −ργ1∆γ2
for all ∆ ∈ [0, 1] and some real numbers γ1, γ2 > 0. This social utility
function is continuous and so there is no discrete drop in utility for non-
conformity. Property 1 does, however, require that social utility fall ‘steeply’
for deviations from µ. It turns out, that ‘steep enough’ requires γ1+ γ2 ≤ 1.
Formally,
E2(0, ρ)−E2(ρ, ρ) = ργ1ργ2 ≥ ρ [E2(0, 1)−E2(1, 1)] = ρ
if γ1 + γ2 ≤ 1 (where ρ ≤ 1). So, we require convexity in social utility with
respect to ∆ whereby social utility is more responsive to ∆ the smaller is ∆.
For example, the change from claiming one to two months unemployment
benefit results in a relatively large change in stigma compared to a change
from eight to nine months benefit.
Example 3, a concave social utility function: For social utility to be
concave in ∆ we need that differences in social utility grow rapidly for small
∆. The most extreme example of this is,
E3(∆, ρ) =
(
−∆2 if ∆ 6= 0 and ρ > 0
1 if ∆ = 0 and ρ > 0
Recall that E3(∆, 0) = 0 by assumption for all ∆. Thus, once a positive
proportion of the population conform the full differences in social utility
exist. An extreme example but one where concavity in social utility with
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respect to ∆ is compensated by the responsiveness of social utility to ρ.
Property 1 is satisfied because
E3(0, ρ)−E3(ρ, ρ) = 1 + ρ2 ≥ ρ [E1(0, 1)−E1(1, 1)] = 2ρ
One setting where this example may be appropriate is if there exists an ‘insti-
tutionalized punishment mechanism’ where there exists a norm and ‘author-
ity’ punishes any deviation from the norm.18 In this context the punishment
need not depend on ρ.
Example 4, summary: Consider a general functional form,
E4(∆, ρ) =
(
ρ(2− ρ)(1−∆)γ3 if ∆ 6= 0
ρ(2− ρ)(1 + γ4) if ∆ = 0
for some real numbers γ3, γ4 ≥ 0. To satisfy Property 1 we require that
E3(0, ρ)−E3(ρ, ρ) = ρ(2−ρ)(1+γ4−(1−ρ)γ3) ≥ ρ [E3(0, 1)−E3(1, 1)] = ρ(1+γ4)
implying that
(1 + γ4)(1− ρ) ≥ (2− ρ)(1− ρ)γ3
for all ρ ∈ (0, 1). This is satisfied if γ3 ≥ 1 and γ4 ≥ 1. That γ3 ≥ 1
implies that E4 is (weakly) convex in ∆. That γ4 ≥ 1 implies that E4 is
discontinuous at ∆ = 0. Property 2 requires
(1 + γ4 − (1− x)γ3) [t(2− t)− x(2− x)] ≥ 2β3x(t− x).
This is satisfied if 1 + γ4 ≥ 2β3. So, again we require β3 small.
In summary, a social utility function ‘most likely’ to satisfy Properties 1 and
2 would, as we see in Example 4, be discontinuous in social utility at ∆ = 0
18Our definition of a norm (as the most used action) may not be appropriate in this
context but the analysis is easily adapted to an exogenous norm.
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and have the concavity in ρ and convexity in ∆ properties of Examples 1
and 2. If an agent can achieve relatively high social utility through non-
conformity, even when the proportion conforming is small, then Property 1
is not satisfied and conformity need not emerge.
Note that the relationship between intrinsic utility and social utility is
important in determining whether or not there exists a conformist equilib-
rium centered on a norm x∗. Clearly, however, if social utility is sufficiently
large relative to intrinsic utility and E(0, 1) > E(x, 1) for all x 6= x∗ then
there always exists a conformist equilibrium centered on x∗. The ‘shape of
the social utility function’ is also important in determining the behavior of
agents who do not conform. In Example 1 an agent of type t who does not
conform will clearly choose x = t. More generally, an agent of type t, even
if he does not conform, may choose an action x 6= t and so is still influenced
by social utility.
5 Local interaction
An extension of the model is to allow local interaction (Fudenberg and Tirole
1998). That is, to suppose an agent may interact with only a subset of the
population or that his social utility is determined relative to a subset of the
population. In many instances this seems appropriate, perhaps reflecting
simple geography, such as a norm within a workplace, or that agents only
care about the views of certain others, such as friends. Local interaction also
has the advantage of permitting ‘richer norm dynamics’. In particular, there
can be multiple norms and an increased opportunity for norms to change
over time. How to model local interaction is, however, not so clear and so
we will limit ourselves here to two objectives. First, to illustrate how the
previous analysis can be extended to a local interaction setting. Second, to
illustrate how ‘richer norm dynamics’ can emerge with local interaction. We
leave a more complete exploration of local interaction to future research.
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Suppose that there exists a set of Locations L = [−1, 1]. There is a
continuous probability density function f over T × L detailing how agents
are distributed across types and locations. Local interaction is characterized
by a real number η ∈ (0, 2]. An agent interacts with all those agents within
distance η of his location. Given an action profile a, action x and location l
let ρ(x, l, a) denote the proportion of those agents located between l− η and
l + η who choose action x. Formally, if a(t, l) states the action chosen by
those of type t at location l then19









Given action profile a, if there exists action x∗ ∈ X such that ρ(x∗, l, a) >
ρ(x, l, a) for all x 6= x∗ then we call x∗ the norm at location l and set µ(l, a) =
x∗. Otherwise we say that there is no norm at location l and set µ(l, a) = φ.
An agent conforms if he is at location l and chooses action µ(l, a). Note that
at different locations there may be different norms.
The social utility function can be defined as previously where ∆ and ρ
are determined relative to a location. For example, an agent at location l
receives social utility E(∆(x), ρ(µ(l, a), l, a)) from choosing action x where
∆(x) measures the relative distance between x and µ(l, a). If η = 2 then
there is global interaction and we have the situation previously modelled. If
η < 2 then we have local interaction. Extending the dynamic (and notation)
in a natural way, if there is a shock in period τ , an action x and location l∗
are randomly selected and
ρ(x, l, aτ ) = ρB(x, l, aτ−1) + ε
while
ρ(µ(l, aτ−1), l, aτ) = ρB(µ(l, aτ−1), l, aτ−1)− ε.
19If l−η or l+η do not belong to L then truncate the range of the integrals as appropriate.
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for all l ∈ [l∗ − η, l∗ + η].
In Section 3 we saw that the value of G as a measure of the distribution
of types informed whether or not conformity could invade. We introduce the
analogue in a local interaction setting. Fix an action profile a and location l∗
where µ(l∗, a) = x∗. For all l let ρl := ρ(x
∗, l, a) and define t+l := (1−ρl)x+ρl
and t−l := (1− ρl)x− ρl. Define,










The G function just defined is analogous to that used earlier and serves the
same purpose.20 It gives a measure of the proportion of agents with whom
an agent at location l∗ interacts who will conform to x∗.
Corollary 5: If Properties 1 and 2 hold and conformity is an equilibrium
then ρB(µ(l, a), l, aτ ) ≥ G(aτ , µ(l, a), l) for all l. If intrinsic utility is linear,
Property 1 holds with equality, Property 2 holds and conformist equilibrium
aµ(l,a) is not strict then ρB(µ(l, a), l, aτ ) = G(aτ , µ(l, a), l).
GivenG and Corollary 5 we can begin to explore how conformity may emerge.
Two sketch examples allow us to illustrate some of the issues.
Example 5: In this example the emergence of conformity is less likely than
with global interaction. Conformity will ‘spread’ across locations but not
necessarily across types.
Let f(t, l) = 0.25 for all t and l. Thus, agents are distributed uniformly across
locations and types. Suppose that µ(a0, l) = φ for all l and a shock occurs
in period 1 at location l∗ = 0 to choose action x∗ = 0. Thus ρ(x∗, l, a1) = ε
for all l ∈ [−η, η] and ρ(x∗, l, a1) = 0 for all other l. In period 2 agents at
20Recall that G(γ, µ) = F ((1−γ)µ+γ)−F ((1−γ)µ−γ). In calculating G(a, µ(l∗, a), l∗)
we are essentially summing the G(ρl, µ) over locations near to l
∗. If η = 2 then
G(a, µ(l∗, a), l∗) = G(ρ(a), a).
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locations l ∈ [−η, η] who have types ‘close’ to 0 will conform as illustrated in
Figure 3a. Suppose that ‘close’ is t ∈ [−γε, γε] for some γε. Now ρ(x∗, l, a2) >
0 and µ(l, a2) = x∗ for all l ∈ (−2η, 2η). The closer, however, is l to l∗
then the larger is ρ(x∗, l, a2). Specifically, ρ(x∗, l, a2) = γε(1− |l| /2η) for all
l ∈ (−2η, 2η). The larger is ρ(x∗, l, a2) then the wider the range of types
at location l for which conformity is a best reply. So, in Period 3 we get a
‘diamond’ of type, location combinations within which agents would conform
to x∗. At the limit of the diamond only those with types t = x∗ choose x∗. In
period 3 we have ρ(x∗, l, a3) > 0 for all l ∈ (l∗ − 3η, l∗ + 3η) while ρ(x∗, l, a3)
is still larger the closer is l to x∗, and so on.
If conformity is to emerge then the ‘diamond’ of Figure 3a must ex-
pand rather than contract over time. From Corollary 5 we know that if
G(x∗, l, aτ) > ρ(aτ , x∗, l) then conformity can spread at location l. As we
have seen, however, the further is l from x∗ then the lower is G(x∗, l, aτ).
This makes it more difficult for conformity to emerge in the local interac-
tion setting. Specifically, we know that if intrinsic utility is linear, Prop-
erty 1 holds with equality and conformist equilibrium ax
∗
is not strict then
γε = ε. Calculation yields G(x
∗, 0, a2) = 3
4
ε and G(x∗, η, a2) = ε
2
. Crucially,
ρB(x∗, l, a2) = G(x∗, l, a2) < ε for all l and so conformity is disappearing.
We know, however, from Theorem 1, that conformity would emerge in this
setting if η = 2. If η < 2 then ‘twice the density’ of agents with types near
x∗ are required so that ρ(x∗,−η, a2) ≥ ε and conformity can emerge.
Finally, note that, if the norm emerges, then ρ(aτ , x∗, l) > 0 for all l ∈
(l∗ − τη, l∗ + τη) and so, in the absence of further shocks, the norm will
necessarily spread until ρ(aτ , x∗, l) > 0 for all l ∈ L.¥
Example 6: In this example local interaction makes it easier for conformity
to emerge. Conformity may not ‘spread’ across locations.
Suppose that distribution f is such that ‘most agents at location l have types
near to t = l’. That is, location is strongly correlated with type. Agents who
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interact therefore tend to have the same type. With the aid of Figure 3b
we can trace through the differences with the earlier example. In period 2
the diagram is the same. If, however, η is small then G(x∗, l∗, a2) ' 1 and
G(x∗, l∗ − η, a2) ' 0.5 because almost all of the agents around l∗ have types
near to x∗. In terms of Figure 3a all agents at locations around l∗ have
types ‘in the shaded area’. This results in a ‘stretching out’ of the diamond
in Period 3, as illustrated in Figure 3b, because any type of agent would
conform with such a high proportion of agents conforming. Consequently
G(x∗, η, a3) ' 1 because all of agents around l∗− η will have types near to l∗
and in the shaded area, and so on.
Conformity can emerge very easily in this setting. Indeed, any action
could become a norm. Even if there are relatively few agents with a particular
type x∗ this need not stop x∗ emerging as a norm provided that an agent of
type x∗ interacts with other agents who have types near to x∗. Conformity
need not, however, spread across locations. That half of the agents with
whom a person interacts conform is a large inducement to conform. But,
the further removed is l from x∗ the fewer are the agents of the type that
want to conform even with this inducement. Generally, there exists a set
of types Tn(x∗) where the best reply is to not conform even if ρ(x∗) = 0.5.
At locations distant from l∗ it may be that all agents have types belonging
to Tn(x∗). Thus, there may be a ‘stable state’ where an x∗ norm exists at
locations around l∗ but not at more distant locations.¥
These two examples illustrate some of the issues concerning the emergence of
norms in local interaction setting. We have not, as yet, however, addressed
the possible consequences of different norms at different locations. In Ex-
ample 6 the presence of multiple norms appears inevitable while in Example
5 we might expect that it depends on the frequency of shocks and speed
with which conformity spreads. Clearly, however, multiple norms are possi-
ble. Suppose that there exists location l such that µ(a, l0) = x1 for l0 < l
and µ(a, l00) = x2 for l00 > l. A first observation is that µ(a, l) = φ and
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ρ(a, x1, l) = ρ(a, x2, l).21 Thus, an agent ‘at the boundary’ between norms
must interact with as many conforming to x2 as conforming to x1. Revisiting
Example 6 allows us to illustrate the implications of this.
Example 6’: The distribution over types is assumed to be the same as
Example 6. In addition, if l > l0 then there are proportionally more agents
around location l than location l0. Consider the boundary between norms at
location l. If ρ(a, x1, l) = ρ(a, x2, l) then proportionally more agents must
be conforming to norm x1 than x2 to balance up the fact that there are
potentially more agents to conform to norm x2 than x1. This requires a
precise balancing act of forces such as in Figure 4. This may suggest that
a ‘stable’ boundary between norms is unlikely but, on reflection, there is
no reason to suppose it should not occur. In particular, at lower locations
the norm x2 will begin to ‘die out’ and at higher locations the norm x1 will
begin to ‘die out’ so a stable boundary location may occur. If it does occur,
however, norms must be sufficiently distinct. Let Tc(x2) be the set of types
that would want to conform to an x2 norm if ρ(x2) ≥ 0.5. If all agents at
location l have types belonging to set Tc(x2) and l < x2 then, given the bias
in f , we should expect ρ(a, x2, l) > 0.5 > ρ(a, x1, l) and the norm at l must
be x2. Thus, if x1 ∈ Tc(x2) we could not expect to observe an x2 and an x1
norm coexisting. For sufficiently low l, however, some agents will not have
types belonging to Tc(x2) and the x2 norm will begin to die out. At this
point a different norm could exist. Given the correlation between type and
location this implies that x1 and x2 must be sufficiently distinct.¥
This section has only briefly touched on the issues that arise with local in-
teraction but has hopefully served its purpose. One conclusion that we can
draw is how the emergence of conformity will depend on the nature of agent
interaction. For example, if an agent’s social utility is determined by his in-
teraction with agents that have similar preferences then this encourages the
21This follows from the definitions of a norm.
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emergence of conformity. This also allows multiple norms to emerge across
agents with different preferences.
6 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed a model of conformity in which there exists both con-
formist and non-conformist equilibria and have provided conditions under
which conformity does or does not emerge. Three things prove important in
the emergence of conformity. First, the distribution of types in the popula-
tion. The more agents have types ‘close to the norm’ then the more likely
is conformity to emerge. Second, the ‘shape of the social utility function’.
The larger are the losses in social utility for deviation from the norm then
the more likely is conformity to emerge. Finally, the topology of agent inter-
action. Whether agents interact with subsets of the population and whether
they interact with agents of similar types can impact on the emergence of
conformity.
We highlight four areas for future research. The issue of local interaction
is clearly one area that could be explored more deeply with differing assump-
tions on the ‘network of interaction’. A second issue is the rate at which
conformity may emerge. The current paper details the ‘long run’ outcomes
of the dynamic but the literature on equilibrium selection has highlighted the
importance of looking also at rates of convergence (Fudenberg and Levine
1998). Intuitively one could expect a short waiting time for conformity to
emerge given that its emergence requires only one shock. It may take longer,
however, for population wide conformity to emerge. In particular, if a norm
and stable state emerge where half of the population conform to some norm
it appears unlikely that the norm would change in ‘normal time’ to one where
all agents would want to conform, even if such a norm exists. A related issue
is the stability of equilibrium. We have taken the approach in this paper that
the initial state could be the non-conformist equilibrium and have provided
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conditions under which conformity may emerge. A distinct approach would
be to set the initial state as a conformist equilibrium. One would expect that
conformity can ‘survive’ under more general conditions than it can emerge.
One final issue is how things change with incomplete information about the
norm. For example, if the norm is to tip 15% in a restaurant how should it be
interpreted if an agent tips 14%. In the Examples of Section 4 we assumed
that social utility dropped quickly for deviations from the norm. This is
consistent with Bernheim (1994). Azar (2004), however, makes the case that
social utility should not drop quickly around the norm given the ‘fuzziness’
at the margin as to whether agents are conforming or not. In our framework
this argument is not so appropriate given that we also judge the strength of
conformity by the proportion choosing the norm (and not something near
the norm). It would be interesting, however, to see how the dynamics of
conformity change if agents who choose actions near to the norm are seen as
potentially conforming, both in terms of the social utility they receive and
the perceived level of conformity within in the population.
7 Appendix
Theorem 1 and the corollaries are proved with the help of 6 Lemmas.
Lemma 1: For any action profile a and type t, if x = BRt(a) and t < µ
then t ≤ x ≤ µ or if t > µ then t ≥ x ≥ µ.
Proof: Set t < µ. If x < t then I(0) ≥ I(t − x) and E(∆(t), ρ(a)) ≥
E(∆(x), ρ(a)). But then u(t, t, a) ≥ u(x, t, a) and so t ∈ Bt(a) contradict-
ing that x = BRt(a). If x > µ then I(µ − t) ≥ I(x − t) and E(0, ρ(a)) ≥
E(∆(x), ρ(a)). But then u(µ, t, a) ≥ u(x, t, a) and so µ ∈ Bt(a) again con-
tradicting that x = BRt(a). A symmetric argument treats t > µ.¥
Lemma 2: For any action profile a where µ := µ(a) and any types t1, t2 ∈ T ,
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if µ = BRt1(a) and µ = BRt2(a) then µ = BRt(a) for all t ∈ (t1, t2). Also
µ = BRµ(a).
Proof: First, I(0) ≥ I(x) for all x and E(0, ρ) ≥ E(∆(x), ρ) for all ρ and x.
Thus, µ = BRµ(a). If µ = BRt(a) then
I(t− x)− I(t− µ) ≤ E(0, ρ(a))− E(∆(x), ρ(a))
for all x. Suppose that t1 < t < µ. By concavity of I
I(t1 − x)− I(t1 − µ)
µ− x ≥




for all x ≥ t1 and so µ = BRt(a) whenever µ = BRt1(a). A symmetric
argument treats t1 > t > µ.¥
Some notation: Given an action profile a let t+ := (1− ρ(a))µ(a) + ρ(a) and
t− := (1− ρ(a))µ(a)− ρ(a).
Lemma 3: Consider action profile a and norm µ = µ(a). If Property 1 holds
and there exists a conformist equilibrium centered on µ then u(µ, t+, a) ≥
u(t+, t+, a) and u(µ, t−, a) ≥ u(t−, t−, a). If intrinsic utility is linear, Prop-
erty 1 holds with equality and conformist equilibrium aµ is not strict then
u(µ, t, a) < u(t, t, a) for any t < t− or t > t+. If intrinsic utility is linear,
there does not exist a strict conformist equilibrium aµ and Property 1 does
not hold then u(µ, t+, a) < u(t+, t+, a) and u(µ, t−, a) < u(t−, t−, a).
Proof : Consider t+. If there exists a conformist equilibrium centered on µ
then
I(1− µ) +E(0, 1) ≥ I(0) +E(1, 1). (7)
By property 1
E(0, ρ(a))−E(ρ(a), ρ(a)) ≥ ρ(a) [E(0, 1)−E(1, 1)] (8)
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Note that ∆(t+) = ρ(a) and so
u(µ, t+, a) = I(t+ − µ) +E(0, ρ(a)) ≥ I(0) +E(ρ(a), ρ(a)) = u(t+, t+, a)
if
ρ(a) ≥ I(0)− I(t
+ − µ)
I(0)− I(1− µ) . (9)
By Assumption 1 and concavity,



















1− µ = ρ(a).
This demonstrates the first part of the proof. If intrinsic utility is linear,
Property 1 holds with equality and conformist equilibrium aµ is strict then
the inequality of equations (9), (8) and (7) can be replaced with equalities.
Thus u(µ, t+, a) = u(t+, t+, a). For an agent of type t > t+ this implies that
u(µ, t, a) < u(t, t, a). If intrinsic utility is linear, there does not exist a strict
conformist equilibrium and Property 1 does not hold then equation (9) holds
with equality, (7) with a less than inequality and (8) with a strictly less than
inequality implying that u(µ, t+, a) < u(t+, t+, a) as desired. A symmetric
argument treats t−.¥
Lemma 4: Consider action profile a where µ := µ(a). If Properties 1 and 2




⊆ {t ∈ T : µ = BRt(a)}
If intrinsic utility is linear, there does not exist a strict conformist equilibrium
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aµ and Property 1 holds with equality but Property 2 does not hold then
µ 6= BRt+(a),BRt−(a).
Proof : From Lemma 2 we only need check that µ = BRt+(a),BRt−(a).
Consider t+. We need to show that
I(t+ − µ) +E(0, ρ(a)) ≥ I(t+ − x) +E(∆(x), ρ(a)) (10)
for all x. From Lemmas 1 and 3 we can reduce this to x ∈ (µ, t+). Fix
an x ∈ (µ, t+). Let δ be such that (1 − δ)µ + δ = x. Note that δ =
(x−µ)/(1−µ) = ∆(x) ≤ ρ(a) and ρ(a) = ∆(t+). So, applying Lemma 3 we
know that
I(x− µ) +E(0, δ) ≥ I(0) +E(∆(x), δ). (11)
By Property 2
I(t+−µ)−I(t+−x)+E(0, ρ(a))−E(∆(x), ρ(a)) ≥ I(x−µ)−I(0)+E(0, δ)−E(∆(x), δ)
(12)
Combining (11) and (12) gives (10) and the desired result for the first part
of the Lemma. Now, suppose that intrinsic utility is linear, Property 1 holds
with equality and there does not exist a strict conformist equilibrium aµ. By
Lemma 3, the inequality of (11) becomes a less than inequality. If Property
2 does not hold then the inequality of (12) becomes a strictly less than
inequality. Thus, u(µ, t+, a) < u(x, t+, a) for all x ∈ (µ, t+) and so µ 6=
BRt+(a) as desired. A symmetric argument treats t−.¥
Proof of Theorem 1: The first part of the statement is immediate from
Lemma 4 and the definitions of G, t+ and t−. The second part of the state-
ment is immediate from Lemmas 3 and 4 implying that {t ∈ T : µ = BRt(a)} =
[t−, t+]. The final part of the statement is immediate from from Lemmas 2,
3 and 4 implying that {t ∈ T : µ = BRt(a)} ⊂ (t−, t+).¥
Lemma 5: For any action profile a and action x 6= µ(a), if x = BRt(a) for
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some t then x /∈ BRt0(a) for all t0 6= t.22
Proof: Suppose otherwise. Thus, x = BRt0(a) and x = BRt00(a) for some
t0, t00 ∈ T and x 6= µ. Suppose that t00 ≤ µ. By Lemma 1, t0 < t00 ≤ x < µ.
Repeating the argument of Lemma 2, x = BRt(a) for all t ∈ [t0, t00]. Let ν be
a small positive number. Given that x ∈ BRt00(a)
I(x− t00) +E(∆(x), ρ(a)) > I(x+ ν − t00) +E(∆(x− ν), ρ(a)).
By Assumptions 1 and 2 (continuity) this would imply that for ν sufficiently
small,
I(x− t00)− I(x+ ν − t00) > E(∆(x), ρ(a))−E(∆(x+ ν), ρ(a)).
But this implies for an agent of type t = t00 − ν that
I(x− ν − t) +E(∆(x+ ν), ρ(a)) > I(x− t) +E(∆(x), ρ(a))
contradicting that x = BRt(a). A symmetric argument treats t00 > µ.¥
Lemma 6: Consider action profile a0 where µ(a0) = x∗. If Properties 1
and 2 hold, there exists conformist equilibrium ax
∗
and λ = 0 then either
ρ(a0) ≤ ρ(a1) ≤ ρ(a2) ≤ ... or ρ(a0) ≥ ρ(a1) ≥ ρ(a2) ≥ .... If G(γ, x∗) > γ
for all γ ∈ (0, γ) for some γ then limτ→∞ ρ(aτ) > γ.
22If there is not continuity in the esteem or intrinsic utility function then Lemma 5 may





5ρ if ∆ = 0
4ρ if ∆ ≤ ρ
0 if ∆ > ρ
and set I(t − x) = −5(t − x)2 and F (t) = 0.5(1 + t). Consider initial state a0 where
ρ(0, a) = 0.2 and µ(a) = 0. Now, E5(0, ρ) = 1 and E5(0.2, ρ) = 0.8. Calculation yields,
BRt(a) = 0 for all t ∈ [−0.2, 0.2] and BRt(a) = 0.2 for all t ∈ (0.2, 0.6]. Thus ρ(0, a1) =
ρ(0.2, a1) = ρ(−0.2, a1) = 0.2.
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Proof: By Lemma 5, either µ(aτ) = x∗ or µ(aτ) = φ. By Lemma 2, to each τ
we can associate types tLτ and t
H
τ such then a
τ(t) = x∗ for all t ∈ (tLτ , tHτ ) and
aτ(t) 6= x∗ for all other τ . Thus, ρ(aτ) = F (tHτ )− F (tLτ ). Clearly, tLτ+1 ≤ tLτ
if and only if tHτ+1 ≥ tHτ . So, if tLτ+1 ≤ tLτ then ρ(aτ+1) ≥ ρ(aτ ) implying
that tLτ+2 ≤ tLτ . Iterating the argument gives that tLτ 0 ≤ tLτ for all τ 0 > τ .
Thus, t0τ is non-increasing in τ . If t
L
τ+1 ≥ tLτ then tHτ+1 ≤ tHτ . So, if tLτ+1 ≥ tLτ
then ρ(aτ+1) ≤ ρ(aτ) implying that tLτ+2 ≥ tLτ . Iterating the argument gives
that tLτ 0 ≥ tLτ for all τ 0 > τ . Thus, tLτ is non-decreasing in τ . Note that
because −1 ≤ tLτ ≤ x∗ the limτ→∞ tLτ exists. Similarly the limτ→∞ tHτ exists.
Now, by Theorem 1, ρ(aτ ) ≥ G(ρ(aτ−1), x∗). Thus, if ρ (aτ−1) ≤ γ then
ρ (aτ) ≥ G(ρ(aτ−1), x∗) > ρ (aτ−1). Suppose that limτ→∞ ρ(aτ) = ρ∗ ≤ γ.
Let t−∗ = x
∗(1−ρ∗)−ρ∗ and t+∗ = x∗(1−ρ∗)+ρ∗. We know thatG(ρ∗, x∗) > ρ∗
but, this implies, for sufficiently large τ , that G(ρ(aτ ), x∗) > ρ∗as desired. ¥
Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2: We make use of the concepts of stochastic
stability and a regular perturbation of a Markov Process derived from the
work of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) and developed by, amongst others,
Young (1993). We provide here a very informal discussion of the issues and
the reader is advised to consult Young (1993) for a more complete discussion.
The analysis assumes a non-ergodic Markov Process P 0. This process is
perturbed by shocks that occur with probability λ to give an ergodic Markov
Process P λ. Process P λ has a unique stationary distribution θλ where θλa
denotes the cumulative relative frequency of state a. A state a is stochastically
stable if limλ→0 θλa > 0. Thus, for small λ, only stochastically stable states
are observed with a probability significantly different to zero. The process
P 0 gives rise to a set of stationary states ΣS. When λ > 0 transition from
a ∈ ΣS to a0 ∈ ΣS is possible but requires shocks. The stochastic potential
of a stationary state a is the sum, over all stationary states a0 ∈ ΣS, of
the minimum number of shocks the transition from a0 to a would require.
The stochastically stable states (Theorem 4 of Young 1993) are those with
minimum stochastic potential. That is they are the stationary states that
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can be reached with fewest shocks.
Now consider the dynamic of this paper equating states with action pro-
files. For each action x ∈ X we can derive, assuming that λ = 0, the action
profile −→a τx that occurs in period τ given initial state a0x where µ(a0x) = x
and ρ(a0x) = ε. Let NC ⊂ X denote the set of actions where x ∈ NC if
and only if there exists a finite τ such that −→a τx = a (where a is the non-
conformist equilibrium). If x ∈ NC then no shocks would be required for x
to be replaced as a norm. Let ρ∗x := limτ→∞
−→a τx. Given a real number ρ let
s(ρ) := {min y ∈ Z : ρ − yε ≤ ε}. Informally, if x /∈ NC is the norm then
s (ρ∗x) is the number of shocks that would need to occur for x to no longer be
the norm. For each x /∈ NC set d(x) :=
©
min d ≥ 1 : s(−→a dx) = s (ρ∗x)
ª
.23 A
finite d(x) exists. Note that if ρ∗x ≤ ε but x /∈ NC then d(x) = 1. For each
action x /∈ NC let −→a x := −→a d(x)x and let sx := s(−→a x). For each x ∈ NC set
sx = 0. As we discuss in the final paragraph,
−→a x can be seen as a ‘represen-
tative’ of the action profile that will occur in the long run if x is the norm
and there are no shocks; integer sx is the number of shocks that would be
required for x to be replaced as a norm. [To avoid technical complications we
assume that ρ(−→a x) is not divisible by ε. See the end of the proof for further
comment].
One complication of using stochastic stability is that we require a finite
state space. We ‘construct one’ by amending the ‘original’ dynamic. For
each x /∈ NC and any positive integer b ≤ sx let −→a −bx denote a strategy
profile where µ(−→a −bx ) = x and ρ(−→a −bx ) = ρ(−→a x)− bε. We can think of −→a −bx
as the action profile that results if b consecutive shocks occur from action
profile −→a x. In the amended dynamic when λ = 0 we assume for all x /∈ NC
that (1) −→a x is a stationary state and (2) action profile −→a x occurs in period
τ +1 if action profile a0x or
−→a −bx , for any b, occur in period τ . For all x ∈ NC
we assume that (3) action profile a occurs in period τ + 1 if action profile
23If there exists no such d then put d(x) =
©




−→a τx is a multiple of ε but sequence {−→a τx} never attains its limit.
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a0x occurs in period τ . Essentially, this condenses the ‘original’ dynamic to a
summarized version where, if x is the norm, we ‘fast forward’ the dynamics
to go immediately to either state −→a x or a and then we ‘truncate’ the dynamic
by assuming that nothing else would change. Partition action space X into
subsets NC,X1, .., Xς such that x ∈ Xy if sx = y. Let XF denote a finite
subset of X that contains at least one action x ∈ Xy or NC for every subset
Xy and NC that has positive measure (according to distribution F ). Set XF
is representative of the number of shocks required to move between norms.
The final step in defining the amended dynamic is to assume that shocks can
only occur at actions x ∈ XF and that if µ(aτ) = x∗ then a shock cannot
occur at x∗.
Given this amended dynamic we can consider finite state space Σ that
contains a0x for all x ∈ XF , a if NC is non-empty and −→a x,−→a −1x , ...,−→a −sxx if
x ∈ XF\NC. If λ = 0 then the amended dynamic is a deterministic Markov
chain on state space Σ. Denote the transition matrix by P 0. Let ΣS denote
the set of stationary states where −→a x ∈ ΣS for all x ∈ XF\NC and a ∈ ΣS
if NC is non-empty. If λ > 0 then we have an aperiodic and irreducible
Markov Process on state space Σ with transition matrix P λ. The family of
Markov Processes P λ is a regular perturbation of P 0 as defined by Young
(1993).
The transition from −→a x to any other a ∈ ΣS requires sx shocks. The
transition from a to −→a x ∈ ΣS requires one shock. Thus, applying Theorem
4 of Young (1993), if action profile −→a x∗ is stochastically stable then sx∗ =
maxx∈XF sx. If there exists
−→a x such that sx ≥ 2 then a is not stochastically
stable. We now prove Corollaries 1 and 2 given the amended dynamic.
Corollary 1: if f is not uniform then there exists some µ ∈ X and ν > 0 such
that f(x) > 1
2
for all x ∈ (µ−ν, µ+ν). Thus, there exists ν, γ > 0 such that
G(γ, x∗) > γ for all x∗ ∈ (µ− ν, µ + ν) and γ ∈ (0, γ). Applying Lemma 6,
for sufficiently small ε, ρ∗x > 2ε for all x ∈ (µ− ν, µ + ν). Thus there exists
x ∈ Xy for some y ≥ 2. This gives the desired result. If f is uniform then
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G(γ, x∗) = γ and so ρ∗x ≥ ε for all x. This means that NC is the empty set
and Corollary 1 is immediate.
Corollary 2: if there exists x∗ ∈ X such that G(γ, x∗) > γ for all γ then
by Lemma 6 and continuity of f there exists region (x1, x2) 3 x∗ such that
ρ∗x > 1− ε for all x ∈ (x1, x2). Clearly, sx achieves its maximum for such x
proving Corollary 2.
Finally we can comment on why outcomes given the amended dynamic are
consistent with those of the original dynamic. Lemma 6 and the properties of
G allow us to truncate the dynamic at−→a x and fast forward to go immediately
to −→a x. This is because we know, from Lemma 6, that for any state aτx where




x the dynamic will evolve, in the absence of future
shocks, until the number of shocks required to ‘escape an x norm’ is given by
sx = s(
−→a x). Thus, we are not altering the likelihood of a transition between
norms. Given the nature of XF , and for the properties of the dynamic of
interest here, assuming that shocks can happen at only a finite set of actions
is also acceptable. This is because XF includes a ‘representative’ from each
Xy and so we are capturing the likelihood of ‘escaping’ from norm x to some
other norm x0 6= x. Also, stochastic stability does not depend on the relative
probabilities of a shock occurring at each state (Young 1993). Thus, we can
take just one representative from each Xy. That positive shocks could occur
twice for the same action (possible in the finite setting) is directly ruled out.
Finally, we are imposing that the initial state belong to Σ. Given, however,
that consecutive shocks can erode any norm and our focus is on long run
dynamics there is no loss in generality in assuming the initial state is a or a0x
for some x.
[If ρ(−→a x) is divisible by ε then we have to do slightly more. This is
because if sx shocks occur then ρ(x, a) = ε and ρ(x0, a) = ε for some x0 6= x
and so there is no norm. This means that a must belong to Σ. It also means
the transition from −→a x to −→a x0 requires sx + 1 shocks. Note, however, that
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the number of shocks required to reach a does not change. Further, our proof
does not use that a /∈ Σ. Thus, the conclusions remain valid.]¥
Proof of examples of distributions: We consider the three examples in













if t ∈ (0, 1].
Fix a µ ≤ 0 and a γ. Suppose that µ− γµ+ γ ≤ 0. Then
G(γ) = (µ− γµ+ γ) + 1
2
(µ− γµ+ γ)2 − (µ− γµ− γ)− 1
2
(µ− γµ− γ)2
= 2γ + 2γµ− 2γ2µ.
Thus G(γ) > γ if γ(1+2µ) > 2γ2µ. We know that γ2µ ≤ 0 and γ(1+2µ) > 0
if µ > −1
2
giving the desired result. If µ− γµ+ γ > 0 then
G(γ) = (µ− γµ+ γ)− 1
2
(µ− γµ+ γ)2 − (µ− γµ− γ)− 1
2
(µ− γµ− γ)2
= 2γ − µ2 + 2γµ2 − γ2µ2 − γ2.
Thus G(γ) > γ if γ > µ2(1 − γ). We know that µ − γµ + γ > 0 so γ >
−µ(1 − γ). Thus we have the desired result if 0 ≥ µ ≥ −1. A symmetric
argument treats µ > 0.


















(µ− γµ+ γ)− 1
4
(µ− γµ+ γ)2 − 1
2
(µ− γµ− γ) + 1
4
(µ− γµ− γ)2











µ or µ < 0.
Finally, let f be symmetric around 0with f(t) = 1
4
for t ∈ [0, 0.1); f(t) = 4
for t ∈ [0.1, 0.2]; f(t) = 15
64
(1− t) for t ∈ (0.2, 1]. The full proof is somewhat
tedious but we can sketch the proof for the seemingly most unlikely case of
µ = 0.1. When γ ≤ 1
9
we have µ − γµ + γ ≤ 0.2. So, G(γ) ≥ F (0.1 −
0.1γ + γ) − F (0.1) ≥ 4[0.1 − 0.1γ + γ − 0.1] > γ. For 1
9
≤ γ ≤ 3
11
we have
G(γ) ≥ F (0.2)−F (0.1) = 2
5
> γ. Note that µ−γµ−γ = −0.2 when γ = 3
11
.
So, for γ ≥ 3
11
we have G(γ) ≥ F (0.2)−F (−0.2) = 17
20
. In summary, we have
shown that G(γ) > γ for all 0 < γ < 17
20
. The remaining γ can be treated as
in the first example (f(t) = 1− |t|).¥
Proof of Corollary 5: Applying Lemmas 3 and 4 we know that if Properties
1 and 2 hold, conformity is an equilibrium and ρ(µ, l, a) = ( then µ = BRt(a)
for all agents at location l with type t ∈ [t−( , t+( ] where t+( := (1 − ()µ + (
and t−( := (1− ()µ− (. If Property 1 holds with equality, Property 2 holds
and conformist equilibrium aµ is not strict then µ = BRt(a) only for those
agents at location l with type t ∈ [t−( , t+( ]. The statement of the Corollary is
now trivial.¥
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Figure 1: The range of µ for which conformity can invade in different populations: 
 
























Figure 2: Examples of esteem functions. 
 




2b: Convex and continuous. 
 
 

















Figure 3a: Type and location combinations for agents who conform for Example 5. 
 









µ = x* 
t





µ = x* 
t
0- n + n
Figure 3b: Type and location combinations for agents who conform for Example 6. 
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